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SENSITIVE
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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [ECON](#) [AF](#) [PK](#) [IR](#)
SUBJECT: KARZAI ASKS NSA JONES FOR GREATER BILATERAL POLICY
CONSULTATION

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

[¶1.](#) (C) At their June 23 meeting, President Karzai repeated to NSA Jones his call for a US-Afghan joint team to implement the President's new strategy. He conceded such an initiative could not begin until after the election. Karzai will make his role as a unifying and national, rather than ethnic, leader the focus of his campaign. He pledged to build on advances in governance by strengthening the capacity of sub-cabinet leaders. Karzai worried about how post-election turmoil in Iran would affect US-Iranian relations. He warned that worsening of attitudes could prompt increased Iranian misbehavior in Afghanistan. On Pakistan, Karzai repeated his long-held positive views of Zardari and long-held suspicions of General Kiyani, the army and ISI.

US-Afghan relations: Karzai call for closer consultation

[¶2.](#) (C) Karzai reiterated his support for the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, and his expectation of its ultimate success. He called again for both sides to form a US-Afghan joint implementation team, to operationalize the plan. He cited intelligence and regional issues as elements that required further discussion. He recognized the USG had to limit what it could share in the intelligence field, but asked the USG to increase the quantity of information sharing. Karzai conceded that the joint implementation team could not begin until after the election.

[¶3.](#) (SBU) Karzai agreed with NSA Jones' observation that the two countries were now at a strategic moment. Jones declared that the credibility of the electoral process would be important for advancing our overall goals. Jones argued that the Afghan people now needed some measures to give them hope) improved economic circumstances, jobs, improved security. Karzai contended that agriculture had to be a main focus. The government had to support farmers by purchasing their products this season. He would ask for USG resources of approximately USD 200-300 million.

Campaign themes: Continuity and marginally new initiatives

[¶4.](#) (SBU) Karzai told Jones he would base his campaign on themes that brought him to where he was now: a leadership approach that would be unifying and national, rather than ethnic, and a policy approach that would be compromising and accommodating, to reach consensus. He would continue to campaign outside of a political party, though would have no objection if others built party structures. He complimented the strength of his cabinet and pledged to build on advances in governance by strengthening the capacity of sub-cabinet

leaders. He would focus on reform of the civil service, including establishing a national civil service exam for new entrants. He pledged to bring the USG more closely into a peace process with the Taliban. He would also seek greater USG assistance for dams and electrification projects.

Iran: Implications of post-election turmoil for Afghanistan

¶5. (C) Karzai acknowledged irregularities in Iran's elections process, but expressed concern about criticism from the West.

He asserted such statements undermined the moderate elements within Iran. He feared such statements would anger the Iranian leadership, who, in turn, may focus their anger and actions on western interests in Afghanistan. Jones countered that the President's public remarks had been critical, but measured. Karzai agreed with Jones' assertion that whatever government resulted from the election, its authority and global image would be tarnished. Karzai welcomed the President's remarks on Iran in his June 4 Cairo speech, urging the United States not to return to the harsh rhetoric of the past.

¶6. (C) Karzai asked Jones to inform Washington that he was no longer trying to bring the United States and Iran together. Instead his posture now was one of trying to prevent damage. He again reiterated that Iran would focus its anger over its own domestic developments outward, and towards the United States.

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Pakistan: Trust in Zardari, continued suspicions of others

¶7. (C) Karzai repeated his long-held positive views of Zardari, characterizing him as a good man, and "on our side."

On the other hand, he reiterated long-held suspicions of General Kiyani, the army and ISI. He pointed to remarks by Kiyani alleging Afghan meddling in the current unrest in Pakistan. He also criticized the ISI's decision not to attend the May 8-9 trilateral meetings.

¶8. (C) Karzai suggested the United States should make the next trilateral session more substantive (no further information). Karzai believed Pakistan was seeking greater substantive connections in the US-Afghan-Pakistan process, but the United States had to dispel Pakistani suspicions that the United States was trying to weaken Pakistan. Again, without citing specific problems, Karzai contrasted the Washington session to the positive outcomes in the Afghan-Pakistan-Iran and the Afghan-Pakistan-Russian trilaterals.

¶9. (U) The NSA's party did not clear this message.
EIKENBERRY